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2Abstract
Water charges in the UK, Ireland, Canada and parts of the USA, are largely based
upon house value rather than consumption. This paper shows how charges based upon
consumption could facilitate trading amongst metered consumers, and provide
incentives to non-metered customers to switch to a metered tariff. To develop a
household domestic water trading scheme various environmental trading schemes
were examined, including European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and
Tradable Energy Quotas (TEQs). The derived scheme for water incentivises domestic
consumers to trade and reduce their use of the resource. Although a degree of trading
would be possible on an occasional basis with un-metered properties (by the
substitution of appliances with water conserving models), and conventionally metered
properties (based upon sustained reductions in consumption, but on an annual basis),
frequent full trading would only be possible if smart water meters were installed. We
conclude that, whilst water trading schemes are feasible, they present a number of
challenges. However, due to the availability of a number of existing potential
elements, implementation, at least on a regional basis, could be achievable relatively
quickly. Once an initial scheme is running it could be refined and expanded to other
regions, and nationally or internationally, if appropriate.
1 Water conservation in perspective
Since 2003 it has been a legal requirement for the Government of England and Wales
to encourage water conservation and report on progress every three years (Section 81
of the Water Act 20031). ‘To regulate in a way that provides incentives … for
customers in England and Wales’, is also part of the Office of water services’ (Ofwat)
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Directive2 is for Member States to ‘ensure by 2010 that water-pricing policies provide
adequate incentives to use water resources efficiently and to recover the true costs of
water services in an equitable manner’. So, there is a significant and timely political
and environmental need to develop appropriate water conservation incentives for
users not only in the UK but elsewhere.
The cost of water is critical to the success of any incentive scheme3. For charges to be
related to consumption, the volume used must be measured, but currently only 26 %
of UK homes are metered4. Various studies to investigate the costs and benefits of
installing meters throughout the UK have concluded that metering costs are high in
relation to the benefits. Apart from the purchase cost, there are the installation,
maintenance, reading and verification costs, and the potential social and health costs
particularly for poor families. The Policy Studies Institute5 have demonstrated the
value of different tariff structures but with all there would be winners and losers.
Also, water charges in the UK are some of the lowest in Europe6. So there is little
incentive for UK householders to request a meter and be billed accordingly. However,
in regions such as the South East of England, water stress (withdrawals / availability)
is classified as severe, comparable with the situation in much of Southern Europe.
Simply installing a meter will not necessarily produce a lifestyle change resulting in
long–term water savings. For example, this quote from the Government’s Energy
Review could equally apply to domestic water – ‘The main obstacles to the take up of
energy efficiency are lack of information about costs and benefits, absence of
appropriate incentives, and lack of motivation among customer.’7 . So if metering will
4not motivate water efficiency, what alternatives or complimentary approaches could
be applied in the UK and elsewhere?
Brown8 has suggested that the principles of carbon trading schemes could be applied
to the water sector. For example, she considers the case of a developer who retrofits
water saving appliances into housing association properties with payment being in the
form of in-kind water allowances. The result would be water savings in older houses
with commensurate water saving appliances installed in new build houses as part of
the planning requirements. Although this innovative approach addresses the issue of
water conservation infrastructure in buildings, it does not influence user habits. As an
element of a more comprehensive scheme, the approach proposed by Brown could be
valuable.
Traditionally, people are encouraged to reduce their consumption of a product, or
generation of pollution, in exchange for reduced costs. However, trading schemes
tend to incentivise the participants more than the usual restrictive conservation
measures as each participant is allocated a limit or provided with a specific allowance.
This creates awareness of the value of a commodity by generating, or enhancing, the
commodity’s market. Users with extravagant consumption will have to reduce or
purchase additional allowances. Those with low consumption will have excess
allowances that can be sold and traded.
Currently, the most comprehensive trading scheme in the world is the European
Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). This scheme is multinational and
addresses the major emitters of carbon dioxide (CO2) in a way that encourages them
5to change processes and practices to reduce carbon emissions9. So, could the EU ETS
be translated for use in a water context? A critical examination of the theory, structure
and experiences of trading schemes is used below as a precursor to the development
of a domestic water trading scheme (DWTS) that could provide incentives for
householders to save water and invest in water meters.
2 Background to environmental trading schemes
Environmental trading schemes were first suggested in the 1960s10,11, first
implemented in the USA and have since grown in size and coverage. Although
trading schemes are simple in concept they tend to be complex in practice to ensure
their operability and fairness. However, trading schemes are very good at creating, or
developing, markets and making the participants aware of the cost of the commodity
involved; few, if any, other mechanisms are as effective12 .
In outline, environmental trading schemes are typically initiated when a limit is
imposed, or agreed, on a particular commodity, eg water, greenhouse gas emissions or
food. The limit is normally applied over a time period, eg 5-20 years, and may be
subdivided into reporting periods. Users are constrained by legal requirements, or
voluntary agreements, as appropriate. If the commodity limit, often called a ‘cap’, is
set below existing use, users are encouraged to cut consumption. The cap is divided
into appropriate allowances for the individual participants. The allowances may be
distributed by an authority using a declared methodology (formula) or by auction.
6Each participant must determine if they have sufficient commodity for their needs.
Those with a deficit can make changes to reduce consumption or must buy more
commodity. At reconciliation, each user surrenders the appropriate number of
commodity rights, or allowances, for that period, or they may be subject to a punitive
fine. Hence each user can chose the lowest cost way of obtaining the match between
allowance and use. The trade of allowances may take place throughout the scheme, or
at specific times depending upon the design and administration method. The incentive
to trade is normally to minimise costs, but it could also be to minimise environmental
impacts. To date, the perfect trading scheme has not been produced, they all have
flaws. However, the evolving nature of the schemes and the economic theories and
models that support them should help schemes improve and gain acceptability.
A fundamental issue with environmental trading schemes is the ownership of the
commodity concerned. With water, it can be argued that as rain falls on everyone;
water should be owned by all and is a right, not a commodity. This argument ignores
the fact that most water is not suitable for drinking and that the work and equipment
involved in treating and distributing water needs to be paid for. However, as most
water is not drunk, there are arguments that water is over-treated and people should
not have to pay for a quality they do not require13.
Whilst many people will be willing to pay an increased price, as water is a necessity
its price has to be carefully considered. Although the cost of water is low compared to
other utilities, there are people who have difficulty paying for it. Any proposed
increase needs to be related to the customers’ abilities to pay14,15.
7One common fundamental problem with environmental trading schemes appears to be
an almost complete lack of trading16. Another problem with such economic incentives
is the inadequate consideration of externalities for the particular market17. Trading
schemes generally take many years to develop and need regular reviews to ensure
fairness and achievement of the aims. While the concept is simple and
straightforward, and most participants want winners and losers in order to stimulate
trade, in practice no one wants to be a loser.
3 Methodology
As noted above, the use of a trading scheme for domestically supplied water has been
suggested by Brown8 as a concept at developer and housing association level. To
determine whether a wider domestic water trading scheme (DWTS) is indeed feasible,
a literature review was undertaken evaluating existing trading schemes; assessing
their suitability for adaptation to the water sector. Collated information was then
structured to identify key details of candidate trading schemes (see Table 1).
Table 1a. Candidate trading schemes - International 1
Scheme title Lessons for water Key facts or summary
European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme EU ETS Phase 1
This scheme has a structure that is
readily applicable to a water trading
scheme
Trial emissions trading scheme
for CO2 in the EU
European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme EU ETS Phase 2
As for phase 1 +. Links with other
schemes create options and also
increase uncertainty
First phase of Kyoto linked
Europe wide CO2 trading
scheme
8Table 1b. Candidate trading schemes - National 2
Scheme title Lessons for water Key facts or summary
United Kingdom Emissions
Trading Scheme UK ETS
Relative targets do not limit
consumption as well as absolute
targets, but relative targets are
simpler to police
Relative cap UK only scheme to
obtain tax rebates
Energy Performance Commitment
EPC -proposed UK ETS United
Kingdom Emissions Trading
Scheme
The quality of smart meters and their
communication network are key to
the operation of such schemes
Mandatory scheme proposed for
industry that is not covered by
EU ETS covering energy usage
not emissions
Local exchange trading schemes
(LETS)
The service and skills based, links
could be made with water conservers
who could help others implement
water savings
Non-financial trading scheme
between local individuals, but
linked nationally through
LETSlink UK
Landfill Allowance Trading
Scheme (LATS)
If the reconciliation date was
staggered throughout the year the
administration burden could be
levelled and ease the development of
regular trading
Waste disposal authorities
landfill allowance trading
scheme to help the UK reduce
biodegradable municipal waste
(BMW) to reach its EU Landfill
Directive obligation
Water Rights Trading (UK) This existing scheme could be linked
to the proposed scheme by
development plans that would change
the volume of water currently being
abstracted
Water abstraction licence
holders can trade water rights to
provide flexibility to manage
their water needs
Waterfind (Australia) The concept of participants donating
allowances to others, instead of
trading them in the market, is an
option that could be considered in the
On-line water market set up to
enable irrigators’ excess water
to be donated to environmental
projects
9future
Solvent Trading Scheme The predetermined cap reductions
could be applied to water use areas,
communities or individual households
for long term planning of water
resource development
The USA’s first cap and trade
scheme for industrial solvent
users with a progressively
tightening cap
Transferable water permits for
Tasman district in the Waimea
plains
Trials need to be conducted in areas
that may not be the most water
stressed, as the price of failure could
be too high
New Zealand scheme with
permanent and temporary water
permit transfers for urban and
rural users in the Wellington area
NOx Budget Trading Program
(NBP)
The one off allowance to help at the
start of the scheme, to maintain
service, could be translated to a
special rebate for communities
joining the scheme
Cap and trade scheme for
installations over 25MW to
reduce national ozone levels in
the USA
Acid Rain NOx Reduction
Program
The relative targets of this simple
straightforward scheme may explain
its longevity
Scheme to reduce acid rain in
the USA by reducing SO2 and
NOx through allowance trading.
Table 1c. –Candidate trading schemes - Regional 3
Scheme title Lessons for water Key facts or summary
Hunter River salinity trading
scheme
On-line trading works. Good adequate
consultation is vital
Control of saline discharges in
to the river to improve its
freshness
Watermove Trading can be carried out by other
means than just on-line. Currently, it
would be too ambitious for a first
stage trial
Confidential water trading in the
Victoria area of Australia with
exchanges every Thursday
creating a volume limited ‘pool
price’ within the various trading
10
zones of the region
Interstate Water Trading Project,
Murray Darling Basin
The concept of ‘no new water’ could
usefully be applied to various
developments
No new water, so existing water
rights to irrigators have to be
traded to conserve resource
Manawatu-Wanganui Regional
Councils Oroua Catchment Plan
The lack of trading may be related to
the apparent threat that the scheme
makes if it is put in operation.
The link to an environmental event
suggests that for a UK water trading
scheme, this could be paralleled for a
drought situation.
The First regional plan
developed under the New
Zealand Resource Management
Act to include a transferable
water permit scheme as part of a
resource management plan for
the river. Transfers can only
take place once the river level
has dropped below a threshold
(30% mean flow) So far there
has been no trading
Transferable water permits for
Tasman district in the Waimea
plains
Trials need to be conducted in areas
that may not be the most water
stressed, as the price of failure could
be too high
New Zealand scheme with
permanent and temporary water
permit transfers for urban and
rural users in the Wellington area
Regional Clean Air Incentives
Market RECLAIM
The linking of an industrial scheme
with a personal scheme is novel but
the issue of fraud puts this model into
question
To improve air quality in the
area around LA by trading
allowances outside of state
limits
Table 1d. Candidate trading schemes - Personal 4
Scheme title Lessons for water Key facts or summary
Personal Carbon Trading
domestic tradable quotas (DTQs)
or tradable energy quotas (TEQs)
Computer administered trading needs
to be adopted if the scheme is
expanded to the whole country’s 24
Trading within a carbon budget
by every individual at each
transaction, to create awareness
of carbon and help reduce
emissions and pollution
worldwide
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million households.
Free allocation of allowances would
not be applicable to water due to
distribution and treatment costs.
As the EU ETS is the largest and most developed scheme it arguably provides the best
basis for a water trading scheme. Many of the issues of competitiveness, monitoring,
transparency and allocation methodology have been resolved and the lessons learnt
could be applied to a DWTS. However, as EU ETS only covers major industrial
emitters, it would need considerable modification to deal with households.
A personal form of trading scheme that has been proposed in the Carbon emission
field is known as DTQs (Domestic Tradable Quotas) or TEQs (Tradable Energy
Quotas)18. Such schemes, based upon the global ownership principal, provide every
human with an equal allocation of credits in a carbon account. Every transaction
would include an exchange of carbon credits for the associated carbon cost, by using a
form of credit, or identity, card account. Such a scheme would require large
investments and commitment on a national, if not international, scale19 but the
concept has received Government backing as a long term possibility20. A DWTS
could form a bridge between the established large scale upstream schemes, such as
EU ETS, and the much more downstream schemes like the proposed TEQs. The links
and parallels between the key elements of EU ETS, TEQs21 and a hypothetical DWTS
are set out in Table 2.
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Table 2 - Comparison of trading schemes Table 5
EU ETS Hypothetical DWTS TEQs
Allocation method by
grandfathering
Allocation by meter records Allocation by entitlement
Allocation method by
benchmark
Allocation by water audit Allocation by auction
Sector classifications Consumption profiles Individual or organization
National cap National or regional or catchment
cap
Carbon budget
New Entrant Reserve (NER) New development reserve – if
required
Auction
Closure issues Demolition of property / change of
use
Retirement of quotas
Reconciliation Reconciliation (annually) Budget monitoring (constant)
Trading of allowances Trading of allowances Trading of quotas
Links with JI and CDM Schemes undertaken by
communities could have benefits
distributed to the affected
households and others in the
community. Schemes outside of a
catchment area could be considered
to be similar to CDM projects.
Possible transfer of some
quotas to other countries for
holidays and business travel
Table 2 indicates that some links between the schemes are stronger than others and
some will need further work to develop.
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4 Proposed basis for a domestic water trading scheme
4.1 Scope and limitations
By examining various extant and planned schemes (as discussed above), it is possible
to outline a basis for a UK DWTS. Most schemes rely upon metering to determine use
of the controlled substance (eg fuel, water, etc), however it has to be accepted that in
the UK, for the foreseeable future, the majority of users will not be metered. Although
a national scheme would be appropriate in some countries, the ownership of water
companies and the large number of water catchment areas in the UK suggests that a
regional catchment based scheme would be the ideal and this fits in with the
principles of the Water Framework Directive2. The outline structure of a proposed
scheme is shown in Figure 1. The key elements are expanded upon in the following
paragraphs.
Figure 1 to go hereabouts
4.2 Water Audit
The simplest way of determining household water consumption would be to use water
meters. However, meters22 have only been fitted in all new houses in the UK since
1989, so alternative means are needed in the vast majority of the housing stock. One
way of dealing with the lack of metering is to utilise water audits to determine
baselines, changes, and investigate complaints. In a similar way to tax returns,
householders could be required to complete an assessment that would provide the
basis for determining their water use rating and hence their water bill. Audits could be
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conducted annually and submitted with the annual electoral roll reviews. The data
obtained through the audit needs to be processed to determine consumption and any
indicative trends.
Another approach is to build upon the method used in the various established
environmental rating schemes such as BREEAM (BRE environmental assessment
method) and LEED (leadership in energy and environmental design). These use
simple spreadsheets and average values for benchmarks, but can be restrictive in their
suitability for non-standard situations.
Alternatively, a simple survey could be conducted by a trained professional auditor or
by the householder with guidance. An example of a user-conducted audit with good
guidance is the Canadian ‘Wise Water Use Guide’23 .
Some aspects of an audit may already be held on databases that could be accessed by
appropriate bodies. Such databases include: the electoral roll, planning records, recent
census, tax return, credit rating and market intelligence databases. Although it may be
useful to collect as much information as possible, this must be balanced against cost,
time, civil liberties, data protection and freedom of information issues.
4.3 Water charge determination
From the audited returns, annual consumption volumes can be calculated for each
household. It will be more justifiable than the current rateable value based charge.
Metered installations’ consumption will be determined from the meter readings, and
adjusted where necessary using information obtained from the audit, especially when
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a meter has not been installed for the full accounting period. The benefit of
conserving water could be translated into reduced treatment costs resulting in lower
supply charges. However, any additional administration costs due to running the
scheme can be wholly or partially passed on.
In addition, the appropriate externalities will be calculated and fed in. Although
individual external influences may be small, their consolidated effect needs to be
incorporated into the pricing of water. The ExternE project has been carried out for
over 15 years into externalities24. It has produced a methodology for energy that is
applicable to water due to the study’s comprehensive methodology.
4.4 Un-metered trading (rebate)
The overall objective of the scheme is that householders will be able to moderate their
consumption and save water. Un-metered dwellings will have a restricted annual
scheme of rebates and audits. If the householder has no interest in trading they may
continue to pay the projected charge.
Un-metered households cannot make financial savings by changing habits, but by
installing water conserving appliances and then applying for a new water audit, which
will revise the chargeable volume, until another audit or the property is sold. A similar
UK scheme is currently in operation for commercial properties using the Enhanced
Capital Allowance (ECA) scheme that enables firms to recover all of the capital
expenditure against taxable profits25. Within the ECA there are currently three
schemes; one covers water conserving products.
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Such a scheme could provide un-metered users with the additional incentive to
request a meter to enter fully into the trading scheme and save more than any cost
associated with a meter. Although metered installations would not need to obtain
‘approved’ appliances to enable trading, promotion of such appliances to the un-
metered installations could encourage metered customers to regularly review their
own appliances.
4.5 Metered trading
Metered customers will have the greatest opportunities for savings and to benefit from
trading as they will be able to trade any monthly surplus throughout the year. The
administrators of the scheme have a dual incentive to make trading work for the
metered householders; a) encourage further take-up of meters, and b) collect more
accurate data on water use for better water management26.
As demonstrated above, the building blocks needed to instigate a household domestic
water trading scheme in the UK are generally available and have been tried and
tested. Table 3 sets out some of the established components that could be used to put
together a pilot scheme. And Figure 2 suggests a detailed structure for such a scheme.
Table 3- Building blocks of a domestic water trading schemee 6
Basic structure (Fig 1) Proposed DWTS Existing ‘blocks’ that
could be utilised
Audit Allocation determined from
meter records
Existing water records
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Allocation determined from water
audit
BREEAM, / Hamilton A guide to
Wise Water Use
Consumption profiles Demographic database profiles
(as used by DCLG for planning)
Demolition of property / change
of use
Planning guidance and policy
Determination of relevant
externalities and their impact on
the water price
Results of the ExternE project by
the European Commission and
the USA Department of Energy
New development reserve – if
required
Planning guidance and policy
Determination of charge
Reconciliation (annual event) EA or SEPA, RDAs or Water UK
National or regional or catchment
cap
EU ETS processTrading
Trading of allowances Carbon market traders
Rebate Un-metered users appliance
rebate scheme
Enhanced Capital Allowance
scheme and the Water
Technology Lists
Incentives for metering Full trading UK ETS
Possible future links Community based projects Planning process, Housing
Corporation, other Member States
Figure 2 to go hereabouts
5 Example scenario
To illustrate how trading could be implemented amongst households a worked
example is provided (see Table 4). It compares four different households: (A) a single
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working person household with a metered supply, (B) a four person household
containing two adults (one of whom is in full-time employment) and two children
with a metered supply, (C) a retired couple with a metered supply, and (D) an
unmetered version of household B.
Each household is assumed to possess a six litre WC, a 120 litre bath a 12 l/min
shower, a 10 l/min kitchen tap, a 5 l/min basin tap, a 50 litre / cycle washing machine
and 20 litre / cycle dishwasher. By applying appropriate usage frequencies the weekly
consumption figures for households A-D are 1.2, 3.5, 2.4, and 3.5 m3/week
respectively.
For the purposes of this illustration, the following tariffs have been applied in the first
year:
A1 A flat rate of £340 a year
B1 A flat metered rate of £2.50/m3
C1 Initial rate of £1.0 per m3 for up to 20m3, second rate of £2.0 per m3 over 20m3
D1 Initial rate of £1.0 per m3 for up to 20m3, second rate of £2.0 per m3 from 20
to 50m3, third rate of £3.0 from 50 to 100m3, forth rate of £5.0 over 100m3
After a base year to determine their allocation, the households adopt different
approaches to the imposed allocations. The single man gives up using the bath, the
family invest in replacement shower head and low flow basin taps, but the retired
couple change nothing. As the allocation is always less than the ‘business as usual’
situation trading should be required.
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The first two households obtain a surplus of water units (say m3), but the third has a
deficit. Although the retired couple could ignore the deficit and not trade, they would
be hit with a fine for exceeding their allocation. The fine is high enough to encourage
trading at a lower cost.
Table 4. Comparison of costs and scenarios over two years of trading
Household
A B C D
Consumption in Year 1 (m3) 56 164 112 164
Consumption in Year 2 (m3) 52 156 124.8 156
Trading benefits (£) 0 0 0 0
Fines (£) 0 0 0 0
Yr 1 trading costs
Expenditure on appliances (£) 0 0 0 0
Trading benefits (£) 40.00 80.00 -128.00 400.00
Fines (£) 0 0 234.80 0
Yr 2 trading costs
Expenditure on appliances (£) 0 180.00 0 0
Tariff A 1 (£) 340.00 340.00 340.00 340.00
Tariff B 1 (£) 140.00 410.00 280.00 340.00
Tariff C1 (£) 92.00 308.00 204.00 340.00
Yr 1 tariffs
Tariff D1 (£) 98.00 550.00 290.00 340.00
Tariff A2 (£) 340.00 340.00 340.00 340.00
Tariff B2 (£) 130.00 390.00 312.00 340.00
Tariff C2 (£) 84.00 292.00 229.60 340.00
Yr 2 tariffs
Tariff D2 (£) 86.00 510.00 354.00 340.00
Table 4 shows that in the first year benchmarks are in effect set for subsequent years.
Only in the second year does the impact of trading start to emphasise the need to
change lifestyles. The tariff structures will impact the overall costs to the consumers,
but careful structuring of the metered customers can take place to ensure that financial
incentives continue to drive efficient water use. Once, most customers have had
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meters installed, the need for trading, in the format proposed, will reduce. However,
without water trading, it might be difficult to encourage such a take-up of meters.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
The proposed DWTS is not perfect; it has weaknesses, but also considerable
strengths. When compared to other trading schemes, the main conceptual weakness is
the established market for water. Unlike carbon, where a new market was needed,
people are already paying for water. The main practical weakness is that it is, as a
whole, unproven. A gateway may be needed, as in DTQs, to enable trading with other
markets such as personal carbon and EU ETS.
Questions such as: ‘who should be responsible for cap setting and organising
trading?’, and ‘what are the operating overheads?’, do not have clear answers. The
allocator of responsibilities would normally be the Regulator, on a national basis, or a
regional authority on a regional basis. Although the cap could be seasonally varied, it
is far simpler to have an annual cap to enable planning to take place. As with all
charges, there will be appeal procedures put in place. If the customer did not agree
with their allocation set within the region’s cap, they could appeal, but any increase in
an individual’s allocation would need to be taken from other household’s allocations
as the regional, or national, cap must not be exceeded. Water companies could operate
a scheme, but Ofwat or CCfW could also oversee or operate one. Other possible
operators include: EA, local councils, or GLC in London. However, an independent
respected operator could be crucial to the success of a scheme by instilling confidence
in investors and minimising time inconsistency problems27.
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The main strength is that the scheme provides incentives to all existing customers and
such a scheme is needed to fulfil National and European legal requirements. Another
important feature is that it can be basin or catchment limited. This would enable pilot
schemes to be run with relatively low levels of commitment. Also, the basic structure
can be used to develop different schemes to provide appropriate incentives in a
locality and link with other issues such as planning and inter-catchment trading.
Sustainability is not just a concern of industry, but also the individual. To date,
although individual carbon trading schemes have been proposed, it is only industrial
schemes (such as EU ETS) that have been set-up and run. Hence, the main models for
water trading, or management of any other individually consumed resource, are
currently mainly industrially based. The candidate trading schemes show that
extensive involvement of all stakeholders is needed, if they are to succeed and the
different stakeholders have focussed viewpoints. Economists and environmentalists
tend to dismiss political issues and advocate the implementation of pure theory, issues
of competitiveness and security of supply are not considered significant enough to
deviate from the fundamental principles. However, Governments tend to complicate
schemes; they address issues of fairness and competitiveness whilst also considering
the economic and political impacts of environmental issues. Such conflicts of interests
and outlook would occur in a DWTS, but with some different players. Within the
stakeholders for a DWTS will be the key gatekeepers that can enable such a scheme
to be developed28.
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The scheme needs to be financially viable and cost effective for both the consumers
and the suppliers. Water Companies need to maintain profitability and realise
measurably reduced consumption. Also, the Regulator needs to be convinced that the
scheme is beneficial, fair to both consumers and water companies, legal, and that no
other better alternative is available.
As with any scheme there will be winners and losers, but potentially, everyone could
win. Water companies could minimise expenditure on expanding supplies and meet
their legal obligations. Customers could reduce their consumption and hence their
bills. However, there could be degrees of winning. Metered customers with smart
meters have the potential to win the most – if they can continually reduce their
consumption. However, the same customers could lose significantly if they increase
their consumption. So, the power to be a winner or loser is in the hands of the
customer.
For the water companies, they may win whatever the customer does. Profligate
consumers will contribute more through higher charges; economising consumers will
require less supply. Even if more people economise than expected, the Water
Company could, in theory – if permitted by the Regulator, just increase prices and
charges to maintain an appropriate return. Regulators could cap charges to impose
financial penalties on companies that have not met previous targets and requirements.
Regulators could also set the allowance limits for householders, the trading unit
values and the conditions.
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There are legislative needs for a mechanism to incentivise domestic water users in the
UK to save water and the DWTS scheme outlined above could help enable the UK
achieve the 2015 target for the Water Framework Directive. Due to the lack of
universal metering a scheme is required that does not rely upon meters, but will
encourage un-metered householders to become metered. DWTS provides incentives
and paves the way for a more justifiable water charging structure. The building blocks
needed to instigate a DWTS in the UK are generally available.
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